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"WHY ADAMS NEEDS TO MODIFY HIS DIVINE-
COMMAND THEORY ONE MORE TIME"* 
Stephen J. Sullivan 
Robert Merrihew Adams has twice modified the divine-command theory of 
morality in interesting and plausible ways. The resulting theory says that 
rightness and wrongness consist respectively in agreement and disagreement 
with the commands of a loving God, and that a causallhistorical account of 
the reference of moral terms is correct. I argue, first, that Adams's theory 
must face up to the objection that it depicts morality-implausibly-as arbi-
trary; second, that the account of reference he accepts does not permit him 
to adopt either of two natural strategies for rebutting the objection; and 
finally, that this account does allow him recourse to a third, somewhat less 
natural strategy which requires modifying the theory one more time. 
For the last two decades Robert Merrihew Adams has been one of the ablest 
defenders of the divine-command theory of morality, which he has modified 
in interesting and plausible ways. In its unqualified forms the theory says that 
morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: an action is 
obligatory just in case and just because God commands it, wrong just in case 
and just because God forbids it, and permissible just in case and just because 
He neither commands nor forbids it.l In his 1973 paper "A Modified Divine 
Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" Adams proposes a version of the 
theory according to which it is part of the meaning of (e.g.) '(ethically) 
wrong' in Judeo-Christian discourse that an action is wrong if and only if it 
is contrary to God's commands, but only on the assumption that God is 
loving. 2 In this way, he emphasizes, the divine-command theory no longer 
has the counterintuitive implication that if God were to command cruelty for 
its own sake then it would be wrong to disobey Him. 3 In later writings Adams 
retains this emphasis on divine love: he identifies rightness with the property 
of being in agreement with the commands of a loving God and wrongness 
with the property of being contrary to those commands.4 But he adopts a very 
different semantic apparatus-primarily in his 1979 paper "Divine Command 
Metaethics Modified Again"-in defending the theory. Influenced by the 
work of Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and Keith Donnellan on causal/histori-
cal accounts of the reference of proper names and natural kind terms, Adams 
maintains (a) that (e.g.) '(ethically) wrong' refers in the language of nonbe-
lievers as well as Judeo-Christian believers to the property of contrariety to 
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the commands of a loving God; (b) that it does so not in virtue of the meaning 
of the term but because this property best fills the partly causal role specified 
by our concept of wrongness; and (c) that it is metaphysically rather than 
analytically necessary that an action is wrong if and only if it contravenes 
the commands of a loving God.s 
I think Adams's second modification of the divine-command theory signifi-
cantly improves it in certain respects. For one thing, the theory avoids the 
implausible implication that when believers and nonbelievers seem to be in 
moral disagreement they are actually talking past one another.6 For another, 
there are both related and independent reasons for thinking that a causal/his-
torical account of the reference of moral terms is indeed correct.7 But I shall 
argue that these improvements come at a certain price: they leave Adams's 
twice-modified divine-command theory exposed to the venerable objection 
that morality is arbitrary if it depends on God's will. 
Section I explains this arbitrariness objection and its relevance to Adams's 
theory. Section II considers two natural ways for him to answer the objection 
and argues that the causallhistorical account of reference he accepts will not 
allow him these means of escape. Finally, Section III suggests a somewhat less 
natural way out which would require him to modify his theory one more time. 
Section I 
In its simplest form, the arbitrariness objection to the divine-command theory 
is that by affirming the thoroughgoing dependence of right and wrong on 
what God happens to command, the theory implausibly depicts them as com-
pletely arbitrary, a matter of divine caprice.8 Perhaps some moral require-
ments are indeed arbitrary-for example, the requirement to worship God on 
this day rather than that one. But many others-such as the duty to avoid 
gratuitous cruelty-do not seem to be arbitrary at all. The point of the objec-
tion is that the divine-command theory ascribes to morality intuitively unac-
ceptable forms of arbitrariness. 
Put this way, the objection may appear to have no bearing on Adams's 
version of the theory. For his version explains right and wrong in terms of 
the commands of a loving God, and therefore9 seems to save both His com-
mands and morality from any objectionable arbitrariness. 
But things are not so simple. It is at least arguable that love itself-even 
divine love-is insufficient to account for all or even most of what God is 
supposed to command and of what morality seems intuitively to require.lO 
The difficulty is one which John Rawls, among others, has raised in connection 
with the ideal-observer or impartial-sympathetic-spectator theory of morality: 
... [L]ove and benevolence are second-order notions: they seek to further the 
good of beloved indi viduals that is already given. If the claims of these goods 
clash, benevolence is at a loss as to how to proceed, as long anyway as it 
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treats these individuals as separate persons. These higher-order sentiments 
do not include principles of right to adjudicate these conflicts. I I 
If this is correct, then although God's love will constrain His commands to 
some extent (e.g., by precluding His commanding cruelty for its own sake), 
it will also leave considerable room for objectionable forms of arbitrariness. 
Interestingly, and to his credit, Adams appears to recognize this point in 
the course of criticizing an ideal-observer theory according to which rightness 
consists in what a loving God (whether or not one exists) would command. 
"I do not believe," he says, "that there is a unique set of commands that would 
be issued by any loving God. There are some things that a loving God might 
command and might not command."12 More specifically, "[v]ery diverse pref-
erences about what things are to be treated as personal rights seem compatible 
with love, certainly with deity."13 
Equally interestingly, but less commendably, I think, Adams also appears 
to accept a significant degree of arbitrariness built into the nature of morality: 
... [A]mong the things that I believe actually to be valid moral demands, there 
are some that I think might have been arranged differently by a God who 
would stilI be loving .... For example, a loving God could have commanded 
different principles regarding euthanasia from those I believe are actually in 
force. 14 
It is surely counterintuitive to suppose that, say, voluntary, passive euthanasia 
for a terminally ill, grievously suffering patient whose relatives prefer her to 
be kept alive just happens to have whatever moral status it does. And so the 
arbitrariness objections poses a challenge even for Adams's modified divine-
command theory. 
Section II 
There are two natural ways, I suggest, in which Adams could try to meet the 
arbitrariness objection (though admittedly each departs so much from his own 
views that it seems unlikely that he would be very happy with it). One is to 
give a more determinate account of divine love in order to explain all or most 
of what God is supposed to command and of what morality intuitively re-
quires. Robert Burch furthers this strategy when he contends that "a loving 
being wills a maximum of pleasure and happiness, and a minimum of pain 
and misery, for those he loves," and that therefore "God must be conceived 
to will that his creatures be maximally happy and minimally miserable."15 So 
conceived, evidently, God issues commands that are nonarbitrary because 
designed to maximize utility (or to be such that individual or general obedi-
ence to them would do SO).16 Whether such a utilitarian elaboration of 
Adams's theory does capture our intuitive moral convictions is no doubt 
debatable; but in this respect the theory is at any rate no worse off than 
utilitarianism itself. 17 
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Alternatively, Adams could argue that God has several reasons or motives 
in addition to love for commanding what He does,18 and that although (unlike 
love) these are not built into the nature of morality, they do suffice (together 
with love) to eliminate any objectionable arbitrariness from what He actually 
commands and what morality actually requires. Admittedly it is possible, on 
this approach, for God to have had no such reasons, or quite different ones, 
for His commands, and so it is possible too for moral requirements to have 
been quite different. But Adams can claim with some plausibility that God 
doesn't merely happen to issue commands for the reasons He does: it is a 
fact about His stable, enduring, albeit contingent character and purposes that 
He is disposed to issue those commands for those reasons. Thus although 
morality could indeed have had a different content, it doesn't merely happen 
to have its actual content. 19 
What might God's additional reasons be? Some remarks Adams himself 
makes about "the motivational force of divine commands" are relevant here. 
This force depends, he says, on "what God's attributes are" and on "how God 
is related to us." For example, "[i]t matters not only that God is loving but 
also that he is juSt."20 And 
lilt matters that God has entered into covenant with us; it matters that there 
is a history between God and the individual and between God and the relig-
ious community-and that the divine commands playa significant role in 
this history, and are related to divine purposes that we see being worked out 
in this history and having a certain importance for our lives.21 
In a different context Adams also suggests that "[a]s the author of all things 
and of all human capacities, [God] may be regarded as interested in many 
forms of human excellence .... "22 
No doubt this account needs to be given much more detail concerning 
divine purposes and motives. But its usefulness to the second natural strategy 
by which Adams might rebut the arbitrariness objection is clear enough. The 
commands of a loving God who is also just, interested in human excellence, 
and concerned to promote certain personal relationships with human beings 
seem unlikely to render moral requirements objectionably arbitraryY 
I very much suspect that Adams would prefer this second strategy to the 
first, and it is, I think, the more plausible of the two. Nevertheless, both 
strategies seem to me to fail, and for the same reason. To see why we need 
to take a closer look at the causal/historical theory of reference Adams adopts 
for moral terms. 
According to this theory, the concept expressed by the term '(ethically) 
wrong' tells us that "wrongness will be that property of actions (if there is 
one) that best fills the role assigned to wrongness by the concept." To fill this 
role a property must be "able to account for the wrongness of a major portion 
of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong," and must help to 
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explain causally our coming to hold these beliefs.24 Adams maintains that the 
property of contrariety to the commands of a loving God meets both condi-
tions: it is correctly "believed by Christians to belong to all and only wrong 
actions," and it "plays a causal role in our classification of actions as wrong, 
insofar as God has created our moral faculties to reflect his commands."2s 
Precisely because of the causal/historical chain linking the commands of a 
loving God to our use of '(ethically) wrong,' there is reason to regard this 
property as ultimately explaining or "regulating" this use,26 and thus as con-
stituting the referent of the term. 
Suppose now-in accordance with the first strategy suggested above-that 
love (alone) motivates all divine commands, and that it thereby explains or 
regulates our use of moral terms. Then the causal/historical account of refer-
ence would seem to imply that contrariety to the dictates of love is the 
property to which '(ethically) wrong' refers. On this approach Adams would 
simply have failed to follow the causal/historical chain back far enough,21 
Does the second strategy fare any better? It is not clear to me that it does. 
Recall that according to this strategy as elaborated above, what motivates the 
commands of our loving God is not merely love but also justice, an interest 
in human excellence, and a desire for certain relationships with human be-
ings. It is this complex of factors which would then explain or regulate our 
use of moral terms, and the wrongness of an action would consist, perhaps, 
in its contravening the dictates of love tempered by justice or its undermining 
of human excellence or of the relationships with God. We might speak here 
of the existence of several kinds of wrongness (much as Putnam speaks of 
the existence of several kinds of jade28), while leaving it open whether to 
explain this in terms of a single, disjunctive referent or in terms of referential 
ambiguity. In either case the true moral theory would be, not Adams's, but a 
rather messy, pluralistic one-which would substantiate the conviction of 
many contemporary philosophers that morality is just too complex to be 
captured by any simple, monistic theory.29 
Adams, it appears, is caught in the following dilemma. On the one hand, 
if he retains his twice-modified divine-command theory, then he is vulnerable 
to the arbitrariness objection. On the other hand, if he adopts either of the 
two strategies I have considered for meeting the objection, then he gives up 
the divine-command theory altogether. 30 
Section III 
In the first two sections of this paper I have raised difficulties for Adams's 
divine-command theory and for natural elaborations of it. Indeed, I once 
believed that from these difficulties he had no acceptable means of escape. 
But it now seems to me that he may be able to salvage the theory if he is 
willing to modify it in a somewhat less natural way, one which might be 
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regarded as a refinement of the second strategy suggested earlier for answer-
ing the arbitrariness objection.3l 
To see how the refinement works, let's put aside the divine-command 
theory for a moment and turn to Putnam's causallhistorical account of the 
reference of natural kind terms. In "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" Putnam 
argues that the nature of the referent of a term such as 'water' consists in a 
unique "hidden structure" which is shared by paradigmatic members of the 
extension of the term and which explains the superficial or unhidden features 
by which we ordinarily identify them.32 He also notes the possibility that there 
are several such structures, as in the case of 'jade'-a term which 
applies to two minerals: jadeite and nephrite. Chemically there is a marked 
difference. Jadeite is a combination of sodium and aluminum. Nephrite is 
made of calcium, magnesium, and iron. These two quite different microstruc-
tures produce the same unique textural qualities!33 
Finally, and most relevantly for present purposes, Putnam emphasizes that it 
would be a mistake "to take [his] account. .. as implying that the members of 
the extension of a natural-kind word necessarily have a common hidden 
structure," or even a small number of such structures. It may in fact turn 
out-as it has in the case of certain disease terms-that the paradigmatic 
instances "have .. . so many [hidden structures] that 'hidden structure' becomes 
irrelevant, and superficial characteristics become the decisive ones."34 
Taking this cue from Putnam, I suggest, Adams might modify his divine-
command theory in the following way. There is indeed some sort of 
causallhistorical chain stretching back from our use of moral terms to God's 
reasons or motives for commanding what He does. But God has so many such 
reasons or motives that the first semantically important link in the chain is 
His commands themselves. These provide a better causallhistorical explana-
tion of our use of moral terms than do His multifarious motives, just as the 
superficial features of a given natural kind may provide a better explanation 
of our use of the relevant natural kind term than do the overabundant hidden 
structures of the kind.3S 
Admittedly Adams might be reluctant to accept this modification of his 
theory because it assigns no special role to God's love, which it treats as 
merely one among many motives for His commands rather than as the only 
one built into the nature of morality. Perhaps this is a price Adams would or 
should be willing to pay in order to save his theory. Or perhaps the suggested 
modification is compatible with giving love pride of place after all, as the 
most central or pervasive of God's motives. 
A more serious worry from an epistemological point of view is that the 
postulation of an overabundance of divine motives seems quite ad hoc in the 
present context. I do not myself find it so very implausible to suppose that 
if the Judeo-Christian God exists, the motivation for His commands should 
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be this complex. But I am no theologian, nor even a theist, and no doubt if 
Adams were to modify his theory in the way I have suggested then it would 
be incumbent upon him to supply independent evidence for such complexity. 
In summary, I have argued for three main points in this paper. First, even 
Adams's twice-modified divine-command theory must fact up to the arbitrari-
ness objection. Second, his own acceptance of a causal/historical account of 
the reference of moral terms prevents him from adopting either of two natural 
strategies for rebutting the objection. Finally, that account does give him the 
resources to meet the objection if he is willing to modify his theory one more 
time by adopting a somewhat less natural strategy, and if he is able to produce 
independent support for the extreme complexity of God's motives for His 
commands. 
Illinois Wesleyan University 
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